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This paper  examines price paths  in sequential  ascending  auctions of  identical  rare 
books in Australia. Economic theory is inconclusive but suggests prices  in sequential 
auctions  of  identical  objects  should  follow  flat  or  rising  paths.  The  empirical 
literature is in several ways unsatisfactory, but points most commonly to  falling  price 
paths.  Data from  rare book auctions promise  to overcome some of the problems  in 
the empirical literature. A preliminary  examination of  rare book auction data from 
Australia indicates prices tended to be equal in sequential auctions of identical boob 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and unequal in the 1970s. These results are consistent with 
the  conjecture  that  more  mature  auction  markets feature  flatter  price  paths  in 
sequential  auctions of  identical  assets. Rare  book auctions are a context in which 
jkrther progress on sequential auctions is likely. 
* The author is grateful to Professor John Creedy, and to Mrs Jill Burdon for her advice about 
interpreting the book auction records. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The topic of  this paper is the path taken by prices in sequential auctions of  identical assets. In 
many settings, prices in sequential auctions have been found to follow a downward path. This is 
the so-called  'afternoon  effect', also referred to as the declining price anomaly, because much of 
the relevant  theory points to flat  or rising  price  paths.  The afternoon  effect is interesting for 
several  reasons.  If  it  exists  only  in the presence  of  particular  auction  characteristics, it  may 
influence decisions about how auctions are structured. In its presence, multiple sellers would care 
about who  went  first. The afternoon  effect  is also important for bidders'  strategies. If  prices 
decline systematically, are there unexploited  opportunities in later sales, or is something real- 
such as risk-being  captured by the difference in prices? 
The empirical work in the area is in several ways deficient. Most importantly, researchers 
have found it difficult to obtain  data from large numbers of  similar sequences of  auctions  of 
genuinely identical objects in contexts with wide empirical relevance. Against the shortcomings 
of  the empirical literature, data from rare  book  auctions  look  promising. As  most  books  are 
produced in runs of numerous copies, pairs of identical books are often put up for sale at the same 
auction  event,  Also,  rare book  auctions  are  institutionally similar to  auctions in many  other 
settings. 
This paper uses data from Australian Book Auction Records to explore sequential auction 
price paths. This dataset  has not been  analysed formally before. It  contains a large number of 
instances where two identical books were auctioned sequentially. Section 2 of the paper presents 
an  overview  of  the  theoretical  literature on  sequential auctions  of  identical objects. Section 3 
introduces the relevant empirical evidence and draws out some directions for empirical  work. 
Section 4 sketches the institutional setting in  Australian book auctions and describes the data. 
Section  5  contains  the  preliminary  analysis.  Strategic  ordering  of  non-identical  books  in 
sequences of auctions is considered, before sequences of  identical lots are examined across three 
subgroups in  the  data.  Results  are  presented  from a statistical analysis  of  price  paths  across 
different time periods and across different book values. Section 6 presents some conclusions. 
2.  SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS 
Theoretical studies of  auctions have tended to focus on sales of single objects. However, sellers 
may wish to dispose of two or more identical objects at once. The objects might be sold together as  one  lot,  or in  separate simultaneous auctions.  The present  paper  concerns  another set  of 
multiple-object  auctions, sequential auctions. In  these auctions, the goods are sold one by  one. 
Information  about  the results  of  the  first round  is released  before  the  commencement of  the 
second round, and so on until all objects are sold. 
The focus of this paper is the pattern of  prices in sequential auctions of identical objects. 
To make predictions about price paths, it is necessary to make assumptions about how bidders 
behave, how the valuations of different bidders are related, how many objects bidders want and 
bidders' attitudes to risk. 
The independent private values set-up 
The starting point in the theoretical literature is a simplified auction environment developed by 
Vickrey (1961) and Weber (1983). 
It is assumed each bidder knows his or her own idiosyncratic valuation of  an object, and 
this  knowledge  is  private  information,  This  is  called  the  private  values  assumption.  The 
valuations  of  different  bidders  are  treated  as  independent  draws  of  a  non-negative  random 
variable whose distribution is continuous and commonly known. A bidder's  valuation is all that 
defines his or her type. The fact that each bidder cannot discern differences between the other 
bidders is referred to as symmetry. It is assumed that a bidder will attach identical valuations to 
objects that are themselves identical. 
Bidders are assumed to be risk-neutral, and to desire only one object. Their utility from a 
second object is zero and bidders are referred to as having 'unit demand'. A bidder exits when he 
or she has won an item.' The seller chooses which asset is to be offered in each round. After each 
round, an announcement is made about the outcome. Weber showed that the outcome is the same 
whether the announcement is 'an  object was sold' or whether it is, truthfully, 'an object was sold 
at price p'. 
Given  these  assumptions, all prices  in  the  sequence have the  same expected value, p. 
They do not drift upward or downward over time. A sequence of prices with the same expected 
value is called a martingale. The proof  of  the martingale result rests on  a backward-induction 
argument in  which  the  assumption  of  independence in buyers'  valuations is crucial, Suppose 
there are k identical objects and n bidders, and, without loss of generality, ken. The best strategy 
It is also assumed that bidders do not cooperate with each other. Collusion is beyond the scope of this paper, but is 
an important dimension of auctions. As yet, no theoretical work has linked price paths in sequential auctions with the 
effects of cooperative bidding. for the k highest-valuation  bidders is for each to estimate the valuation  of  the  (k+l)th highest 
bidder, and to bid no more than this. So all bidders are expected to pay the same price, and the 
price path, on average, is flat.2 This result applies equally to first price and second price sealed 
bid auctions, and to ascending (English) and descending (Dutch) auctions. 
AfJiliated values 
Instead of assuming independent private values, suppose bidders' valuations are affiliated. This is 
explored in detail by Milgrom and Weber (1982). The concept opens up a general framework in 
which common values, where bidders make independent estimates of  an asset's objective value, 
and private values are special casesS3 
With affiliation, bidders are not sure ex ante how much an object is worth to them. They 
base their valuations partly on information they are able to glean from the auction process. More 
formally, each bidder has a valuation function that depends on information revealed about the 
types  of  the  other  bidders,  and  on  private  estimates  of  the  values  of  indirectly  observable 
characteristics of  the objects being sold. The concept of  affiliation  allows us to treat a bidder's 
valuation of an object as increasing in another's valuation. 
In  a sequence  of  first price,  second price  and  descending  auctions in  which  bidders' 
valuations are affiliated, the first auction reveals information about the value of the goods being 
sold in subsequent auctions. Later bidders are therefore less womed about the 'winner's curse'- 
the possibility that they have overestimated an object's value-and  raise their bids. The result is a 
rising price profile.4 In ascending auctions, the bidding process in the first round plays the same 
role  of  revealing  information  about  values,  so the  expected  profile  is flat.  (With  affiliation, 
sellers'  revenues  will  be  highest  with  ascending  auctions,  and  lowest  with  first  price  and 
descending auctions. The price path with second price auctions will  on  average be flatter than 
with first price and descending auctions, and not as flat as with ascending auctions.) 
Risk aversion 
How robust is the martingale result to different  attitudes to risk? In  any series of  auctions  of 
I 
identical objects, risk aversion should be important, as bidders are gambling over their expected 
This result extends to the case where there is uncertainty about the number of bidders, n. 
The common values model is sometimes called the mineral rights model. 
This is one aspect of the 'linkage principle' of Milgrom and Weber (1982). The phenomenon of bidders reducing 
their bids in this way is referred to as 'shading'. utilities in different stages. Risk-averse bidders care about the randomness of their payoffs in later 
rounds, and so might be willing to bid higher in early rounds. 
It has been suggested that adding risk aversion to the independent private values and unit 
demand model would be sufficient to generate a falling price path (Ashenfelter, 1992). In fact this 
is only true of a particular set of  utility functions, ones that feature non-decreasing absolute risk 
aversion (McAfee and Vincent, 1993).' Increasing absolute risk aversion has been criticised as a 
theoretically unsatisfactory characterisation  of  attitudes to risk (Stiglitz, 1991). It implies that as 
wealth  increases, people  are  less  willing  to  gamble.  For this  reason, the claim that  observed 
declining price paths arise from non-decreasing absolute risk aversion is not compelling. 
Multi-unit demand 
In a series of  sequential auctions, it is possible that the highest-valuation bidder's  valuation for a 
second object is more than the kth-highest bidder's  valuation for one object. The unit-demand 
restriction would therefore bind. This and more complex possibilities are relevant to auctions that 
feature  wholesale  buyers,  such  as  wine  and  antique  dealers,  for  whom  the  unit  demand 
assumption is inappropriate. 
What  would  the  predicted  pattern  of  prices  be  if  the  unit-demand  assumption  were 
dropped and bidders  were  allowed  to desire more than  one  object? As yet  there is no clear 
answer. The literature on auctions with  wholesale buyers and multi-unit  demand is early in its 
development,  and there  is no  general  model  of  how  prices  would  behave.  Bidders'  optimal 
behaviours become more complex if multi-unit demand is allowed. 
A special case of multi-unit demand, relevant to wine auctions, is where the winner of the 
first round has the option to buy the next item at the same price, without going through another 
auction. With independent private values, the value of  the option has been shown to generate a 
falling price path  (Black and de Meza, 1992). The great majority of  auction markets lack such 
buyers'  options, so this result does not have wide applicability. Another approach is to treat some 
bidders'  values as  'superadditive'.  A bidder  of  this type values  a bundle of  two objects in  the 
sequence more than twice as much as his or her valuation of  one of  the  object^.^ Branco (1997) 
used this approach to generate a predicted declining price path, Values of this type are relevant to  I 
some real world auctions, but far from all. Menezes and Montiero (1999) extended this work to 
5 This assumes b~dders  use pure strategies. If bidders randomise, a falling path is possible without non-decreasing 
absolute risk aversion, but the outcome is inefficient, and resale is likely. 
Budget and liquidity constraints would seem to operate in the opposite d~rection  to complementarity between 
assets, with success in earlier auctions limiting bidders' aggressiveness later. accommodate both positive and negative synergies between products. They found Branco's result 
breaks down if  one player wants two objects and the others want only one.7 
Agency bidding 
Buyers have been assumed in the previous subsections to be acting on their own behalf. What if 
instead they buy  through  agents? Under  some assumptions  about  agents'  behaviour, a falling 
price profile is plausible.  Suppose an agent has a contract which tells the agent to bid up to a 
specified maximum price for an item, The agent is paid only if the item is obtained at or below 
this price, and the fee is a fixed amount. This agent does not care if he or she buys an object at a 
price less than the ceiling in the contract. The agent is ready to bid  'unstrategically'  in the first 
round  and  pay  more  than  the  agent  has  to-more  than  the  valuation  of  the  (k+l)th highest 
valuation bidder. Mlgrom and Weber (1982) discuss this type of  agent. It is not a satisfactory 
characterisation, as a simple change to the contract-such  as linking the agent's fee to the buyer's 
surplus-would  better align their incentives. 
Stochastically identical objects 
It is possible to relax the assumption that the assets in the sequence are identical. Suppose they 
are only stochastically identical: a bidder's valuations over two assets are identically distributed, 
but not perfectly correlated (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1992; Bernhardt and Scoones, 1994). Bidders 
are assumed to arrive at their valuation of  an object just before it is offered for sale. In this set-up, 
the predicted  price  path  depends on  the distribution  of the  objects'  values. If  the  number of 
objects is sufficiently  large and if  values  are bounded and independent across the objects, the 
price path is on average a downward one. 
This approach can be taken further by allowing each bidder's valuations to be dependent 
across the objects (but still independent across bidders), and assuming bidders know all their own 
valuations  up  front,  Gale  and  Hausch  (1994)  followed  this  route  and  examined  sequential 
auctions alongside 'right-to-choose' auctions, where the winner selects his or her most-preferred 
object from  a pool.  They  found that  with  these  assumptions, sequential auctions can lead to 
inefficient allocations, and that in the case of  those sequential auctions that generate falling price 
paths, the seller would be better off holding a right-to-choose a~ction.~ 
'  This is because the bidders with unit-demand shade their bids in the first round, so bidding in that stage IS less 
aggressive. This offsets the effect of the bidder who wants both objects trying harder in the first round 
The assumption that a bidder's valuations of different assets in the sequence are drawn from identical distributions 
can also be relaxed. Bernhardt and Scoones (1994) show that if two objects have different distributions of bidders' This branch  of  the  literature  is relevant  to  some  auctions,  such  as  of  used  business 
equipment, but is not applicable to auctions with genuinely identical objects and where bidders 
have the opportunity to inspect  lots before  the  auction  starts.  (The same is true of  work  that 
assumes bidders face uncertainty about how many more identical assets will be offered in later 
rounds. Burguet and Sakovics, 1994, showed that such uncertainty about future opportunities to 
buy was sufficient to generate falling prices.) It is also a significant departure from the kinds of 
auctions envisaged in the standard independent private values and affiliated values models. 
Participation costs 
It may be reasonable to assume that there is a time cost associated with waiting for later rounds in 
a sequential auction, In the construction with independent private values, unit demand and risk 
neutrality,  it is plausible  that bidders who face waiting costs are willing to pay more than the 
(k+l)th highest valuation in early rounds, if this higher amount is still below their own valuation. 
The result would be a falling price path. 
An implicit assumption here is that bidders must arrive at the start of the sale; this is not 
realistic for some auctions. Also, the time cost would be low if  the identical lots were offered 
consecutively, which is often the case.9 
Scarcity 
In principle, the identity of buyers could be relevant to price paths in some sequential auctions. 
Consider auctions of  antiques,  art  and  other assets  that  depend for their  value partly  on  the 
number of objects in private hands. When the first buyer in a sequence is an institution, an object 
has been taken out of  circulation, and so the remaining objects will be more valuable than if the 
first buyer had been  a private  collector or dealer. With affiliated values, the result  could be a 
rising price path in a sequence of ascending auctions, and more steeply rising paths in first price 
and second price sealed bid auctions and descending auctions. 
This result depends on the identity of  each buyer being revealed before the subsequent 
round. In reality, the buyer will often be unknown thanks to telephone, agency and order bidding. 
Moreover, the impact is likely  to be  significant  only for the  very rarest  of  objects, which  by 
valuations, the auctioneer should sell the product with the most dispersed distribution first. 
9  Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Menezes (1993) have sought to express in a formula the time at which it is optimal for a 
bidder facing continuation costs to withdraw from a sequential auction. definition  are  hardly  ever  auctioned  sequentially.  Also,  the  possibility  cannot be  ignored  of 
deaccessioning-the  sale of assets by public institutions. 
3.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This section  is concerned with examining how prices  behave in real  sequential auctions. The 
theoretical literature is informative about how to proceed. An auction environment that is a good 
target for study should be well established:  buyers  and sellers should know the rules, and the 
market institutions should be organised and credible. The auctions should be of a common type, 
such as the ascending auction. Before a sequence of  auctions commences, bidders should know 
how many of  the identical assets are to be offered, and their own valuations of  the assets. The 
auctioneer should chose which asset is offered in each round of each sequence, and the outcome 
of  a  round  should  be  announced  before  the  next  round  commences.  Just  as  the  auction 
environment should not be too specialised, so too the objects being sold should not be so unusual 
as to prevent the analysis from being applicable to other settings. 
The objects  in each sequence of  auctions should be identical, not  merely similar. This 
requirement  is  particularly  important.  When  the  objects  are  not  identical,  sellers'  ordering 
strategies can affect the pattern of prices. Some auctioneers follow a policy of  offering the best 
objects  first  in  sequential  sales  of  similar assets.  This  policy  has  been  documented in  print 
auctions (Pesando and Shum, 19961, dairy cattle auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1999) 
and in ancient Babylonian bride auctions.I0 All other things equal, such a policy will generate a 
falling price path, but for reasons other than bidders'  strategies and the structure of auctions. Only 
when  the  objects  being  sold are  identical  can  sellers'  quality ordering  strategies be ignored. 
Whether the objects are identical is also relevant to the behaviour of bidders. Without identical 
assets within each sequence, it is not appropriate to treat bidders as valuing the assets the same. 
Bidders'  idiosyncratic  preferences  over  particular  asset  characteristics  will  affect  the  prices 
realised. Because of the influence of sellers' and bidders' behaviours, auctions with non-identical 
assets pose a different set of  empirical and theoretical  issues to those posed by  auctions  with 
w  identical objects. Studies of  how  auctions work  with  multiple identical assets need  data from 
auctions of multiple identical assets. 
lo Some very preliminary work has been done to explore the ordering incentives faced by auctioneers. The Australiar~ 
Book Auctiorl  Records data permit exploration of whether auctioneers systematically apply a quality ordering in 
sequential auctions of differing but nearly identical assets. This is the subject of section 5.1. To study sequential auctions in an environment with these desirable features, data from a 
large  number  of  sequences  of  auctions  are  needed,  so that  the  results  of  the  analysis  are 
statistically  robust.  The  sequences  should be  fairly homogenous:  apart from the  assets  being 
identical within sequences, they should at least be similar across sequences, and the sequences 
should be similar in terms of where, when and how the auctions were held. 
The prices used in the analysis should be the total prices paid by buyers. Buyers' premia, 
consumption taxes and other imposts on buyers should be added to the hammer prices. The prices 
should be genuine prices rather than highest bids on items that were  'passed in'  for failing to 
reach the reserve price. For these items, no transaction  has taken place, so the  'prices'  are not  . 
prices at all. 
To understand what might be driving the observed price paths, it would be desirable to 
know how  different bidders'  valuations  were related, whether bidders faced complementarities 
between  objects, how many objects bidders wanted  in  each sequence and bidders'  attitudes to 
risk. Unfortunately, data of  this kind are nearly  impossible to get. Auctions  in which bidders' 
valuations, demands and risk preferences are a known input can be simulated, but simulations fail 
to capture how auctions work in the real world, where individuals' wealth, prestige and jobs are 
at risk. Experimental auctions also fail to meet the criterion of an established and credible market 
environment. It would also be useful to know whether bidders were acting as agents, and if so the 
nature of their agency agreements. Again, this information is very hard to obtain. Fortunately, the 
absence of data on individual bidders'  valuations, demands and agency arrangements is not a 
decisive barrier to studying price paths in sequential auctions. 
The key empirical  stutlles in the sequential auctions literature are by Ashenfelter (1989, 
examining  wine  auctions),  Ashenfelter  and  Genesove  (1992,  condominiums),  McAfee  and 
Vincent  (1993, wine), Lusht  (1994, commercial  real  estate), Chanel  et  al., (1996, jewellery), 
Pesando and Shum (1996, prints), Jones, Menezes and Vella (1996, wool), Gandal (1995, cable 
television  licences)  and  Engelbrecht-Wiggans  and  Kahn  (1999, dairy  cattle).  Table  1 gives 
summary details of  these studies, How well do they meet the criteria for analysing sequential 
auctions? Table 1: Previous empirical work on sequential auctions 
Jones,  I  Wool  1  ascending  1  951 lots sold  I  no 
Menezes and  I  1  /  at 6 auctions  I 
Vella (1  996)  in Australia, 
July 1991 to 
June 1994 
real estate  with 44 lots 
I  1 
Gandal (1  995)  Cable  sealed 
Pesando and  Prints 
Shum (1  996) 
ascending 
I  I 
Chanel et al.  Jewellery  ascending 
Engelbrecht-  Dairy cattle  ascending 
Wiggans and 
Kahn (1  999) 
sold 
sold 
25 pairs sold  no 
in the US, 24 
in London, 48 
in Europe 
1977 to 1993 
351 pairs, sold  no 
by CMP in 
Paris, June 
1993 to May 
1994 
1943 lots at 18 
US sales, Oct. 
1987 to April 
1988 
Method 
took price ratios for 
each of four 
auctioneer 
subgroups and 
tested for equality 
with one 
regressed price on 
sale order 
took price ratios, 
tested for equality 
with one; regressed 
second price on 




highest bids on 
passed in items) 
regressed price on 
reserve and sale 
order; no formal 
accommodation of 
quality differences 
regressed price on 
sale order, number 
of bidders in each 
round, and 
variables to capture 
licence area 
features 
ratio of mean 
difference to mean 
price 
hedonic regressions 
for each jewellery 
type 
regressed price on 
independent 






















declining The table  shows  that  researchers  have  struggled  to  find  data  from large numbers  of 
sequential auctions of  identical assets. The studies of  wine auctions by Ashenfelter (1989) and 
McAfee and Vincent (1993) are the only ones to have met this criterion. As was noted above, 
differences  between  the  assets  in  the  sequences  expose  auction  outcomes to  the influence  of 
sellers'  quality  ordering  strategies  and  bidders'  idiosyncratic  preferences  over  asset 
characteristics. 
Studies  by  Lusht  (1994)  and  Pesando  and  Shum  (1996)  are  examples  of  sequential 
auctions studies in which the assets within sequences were not identical, and in which no formal 
1 
attempt was made to address this. Other authors have tried to extract the influence of  quality 
differences. One method is to compare the profile of prices in the auction to a set of benchmark 
prices. Benchmarks used by researchers have included resales in subsequent private negotiations 
(Ashenfelter and Genesove, 1992) and independent expert appraisals (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and 
Kahn, 1999). The rationale is to see how much of the change in prices through the sequences of 
auctions is attributable  to the auction process,  and how  much  to quality differences.  Another 
approach is to standardise non-identical  goods using hedonic regression  (Gandal, 1995; Jones, 
Menezes  and  Vella,  1996;  Chanel  et  al.,  1996).  A  regression  equation  is  estimated  with 
coefficients that capture the influence of specific asset characteristics on the price. Sale order is 
included in the regression equation to see if  it has a separate effect. The key problem with these 
approaches  is  that  the  underlying  assets  are  not  identical,  and  the  results  are  therefore 
fundamentally  estranged  from  how  auctions  work  with  identical  assets.  Studies  with  non- 
identical  assets  might  provide  useful  indirect  evidence  of  how  auctions  work  with  identical 
assets, but it is impossible to say how useful. 
Another  area of  shortcomings in the empirical literature is the type of  auction studied. 
Some of the empirical studies are in specialised contexts whose results are not readily applicable 
to other settings. Ashenfelter's  (1989) seminal study of wine auctions is an example. Wine is a 
specialised product, and wine auctions have some unusual features, including the buyers' option 
that was mentioned above. Ashenfelter and Genesove's (1992) apartment study does not fit well  w 
in the sequential auctions literature because the apartment auction was a pooled  auction, in which 
the  highest  bidder  at  each  stage  won  the  right  to  choose  his  or her  most  favoured  unsold  w 
apartment. Pooled auctions are not strategically equivalent to sequential sealed bid auctions and 
sequential ascending auctions, and are uncommon. They also fail to meet the criterion that sellers 
choose which lot is offered in each round. The jewellery auctions studied by Chanel et al. (1996) 
were also of  a special type. They were held by Credit Municipal de Paris, a body with a legal 
monopoly to undertake auctions of  goods left with pawnshops, That the auctions were judicial pawnshop auctions had a number of implications. Reserves were set equal to the outstanding loan 
amounts for each asset. The surplus of  the price over the reserve was distributed to the pawner of 
the good, The ultimate sellers were captive and had no discretion over the reserve prices or how 
the  sales  were  organised. Gandal's  (1995)  cable television  environment  was  unusual  for the 
strong complementarities between the neighbouring licences, an example of superadditive values. 
Data  problems  figure in  some  of  the  empirical  studies. Some of  the  studies  did  not 
exclude highest prices on passed-in items from the price data that were used. Jones, Menezes and 
Vella (1996), for example, included highest prices on passed-in  items in their analysis of  wool 
auctions.  Several of  the studies had too few data. Lusht (1994) analysed just  one sequence of 
I 
ascending  auctions of  forty-four lots of  commercial real estate in Melbourne,  Gandal  (1995) 
looked at one sealed bid auction of  seventeen television licences. In  contrast, Ashenfelter (1989) 
used data from 4615 sequential auctions. 
It  was  emphasised  above  that  the  sequences  of  auctions studied  should be  somewhat 
homogenous. This extends to the auctions being close together in time, space and style. Pesando 
and Shum (1996) analysed a small sample of pairs of  prints sold over a sixteen year period, a 
period long enough for potential determinants of price paths-including  market institutions and 
the profile of bidder types-to  have changed substantially. Ashenfelter's (1989) sample was very 
homogenous in time, but less so in space and by auctioneer. He addressed this by dividing the 
sample  into  four  auctioneer  groups,  two  in  London  and  one  in  each  of  Chicago  and  San 
Francisco.  The sample used by Chanel et al. (1996) was very homogenous in  terms of  where, 
when and how the assets were sold. 
Several lessons can  be  drawn  from theses  studies. To analyse  sequential auctions,  an 
environment must be found in which there is a large number of sequences of identical assets. The 
environment must not be too unusual, the sequences studied must be fairly homogenous, and the 
price data should be the prices actually paid by successful bidders. 
4.  AUSTRALIAN RARE BOOK AUCTIONS 
* 
With observations about the existing empirical literature in mind, the rare book market looks to 
be  a  promising  environment  for  studying  price  paths  in  sequential  auctions.ll  ~ooks  are 
"  Book auctions have been neglected in the auctions literature, and in the economic literature more broadly, despite 
the fact that books are an important category of collectible. An exception is Cutler et al, (1991), who studied published in runs, and so identical books are often sold at the same auction. It is reasonable to 
expect that rare book auction data will contain a large number of sequences of genuinely identical 
assets. 
In Australia, results from rare book auctions are published every two years in Australian 
Book Auction ~ec0rds.l~  The series covers the period 1969 to 1999 inclusive, except for a gap 
from 1979 to 1982. The issues from 1969 to 1978 were compiled by Mrs Margaret Woodhouse. 
The current series, so far covering the period  1983 to 1999, is compiled by MKS  Jill Burdon. To 
date, 413 auctions and 42,511 transactions have been documented.13 A book is only included if it 
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was sold as one lot, it or another copy exceeded a minimum price at auction at least once in a 
given two-year period, and the book is of 'Australasian  interest'.14 This is defined as books and  . 
periodicals  written  by  Australians,  or  published  in  Australia,  or  written  about  Australia  or 
Australians,  or  about  Antarctica  or the  South  Pacific. For  each  book,  information  about  its 
condition (taken from the auction catalogue) and bibliographic information (author, title, edition, 
date and place  of  publication, and  special  associations  between  the book  and the  author)  are 
given. This allows sequential auctions of identical books to be identified. 
In  section 3, it was argued that  a good auction  environment to study would  not be  so 
unusual as to preclude application of the results to other settings. While the rare book market is 
fairly small, rare book auctions are organised in a way that is very similar to auctions of fine art, 
jewellery, furniture and many other products, so the results are of wide empirical relevance.I5 The 
English or ascending auction, perhaps the most common type of  auction throughout the world, is 
universal in Australian book auctions.16 For all the auctions in Australian Book Auction Records, 
a catalogue of lots was issued before the sale, and all the lots were available for inspection before 
financial returns to a variety of assets, including a small sample of  rare books. 
12 Australiart Book Auctiorl Records is published in printed volumes, in which entries are listed alphabetically. To 
study the data, each title in each volume was assigned a number, and the sale results published over the duration of 
the series were entered into a database. The ABAR volumes are offered for sale by the publishers (Australian Book 
Auction Records) and copies are in the National and State libraries and other major reference collections. The latest 
volume, 1998-99,  was published in May 2000. 
13 More information about Australian Book Auction Records, including the profile of prices in these transactions, will 
be provided in a separate paper.  , 
I4 The nominal minimum price has risen over time. Currently, books must have realised at least $45 in the two years 
covered by  the particular volume to be eligible for inclusion. In the first year of ABAR the cut-off was five dollars, 
The cut-off is not applied religiously: if  two copies of  a book are sold in a given year and only one satisfies the price 
cut-off, the other will still be included. 
15 In the larger book auctions in Australia, particularly those by  multinational auctioneers, books, prints and paintings 
are frequently offered in different sections of the one sale, so the book auction sessions are institutionally identical to 
the art sessions, 
'"n  Australia, the ascending auction is widespread in the markets for real estate, second hand cars, antiques and 
used business equipment. bidding started. Pre-sale display is also the norm in auctions of wine, paintings, prints, jewellery 
and furniture.17 Other basic features of book auctions are common to many other markets, There 
are  secret  reserves.  The  auctioneer  acts  on  behalf  of  sellers  in  return  for  a  commission. 
Sometimes  buyers  are  also  charged  a  fee-the  buyer's  premium.  The  auctions  are  held  in 
salerooms, galleries, hotels and public venues like town halls. They are advertised in the press 
and through direct mail. There are no attendance fees.18 Bids are made at increments decreed by 
the auctioneer.  .  The criteria in  section 3 for studying auctions also referred  to price data. The prices in 
Australian  Book Auction  Records  are  all winning bids; passed-in  items are not recorded.  The 
prices are the total Australian  dollar prices paid by buyers; they include the hammer price and 
any buyers'  premia charged by the auction houses.19 
As  is  typically  the  case  in  real  world  auction  studies,  information  about  bidders' 
valuations  and  other characteristics is not  available.  But  some general  facts  are known  about 
participants in Australian book auctions. The bidders include 'wholesale'  bidders such as dealers 
and  booksellers,  and  'retail'  bidders  such  as  individuals,  public  libraries,  public  galleries, 
universities and corporate buyers. Another way to classify the bidders is into 'amateurs7-private 
individuals-and  'professionals'-those  who buy for firms or in~titutions.~' 
The independent private  values  and common  values  concepts both fail  to characterise 
bidders' values in the rare book market. The independent private values model requires that each 
bidder knows his or her own valuation and that bidders'  valuations are independent. In reality, the 
value to a bidder will depend in part on others' valuations. For example, the value of the object 
may be in doubt, or there may be a prestige value to owning it (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Also, 
bidders  of  all kinds will have  an  eye to future resale prices.  Assuming bidders have common 
values, on  the other hand, does not accommodate differences in tastes, yet bidders  of  all kinds 
will make idiosyncratic judgements  about values, The concept of  affiliated values  is therefore 
most likely to best capture bidders' values in the rare book market. 
Y  Bidders in  the rare book market are heterogenous with  respect  to how  many  identical 
books they want to buy. Private buyers rarely desire more than one copy of  a particular title, but 
w  the same is not true of dealers. Bidders are also heterogenous in their attitudes to risk. It is likely 
"  In the wool auctions studied by Jones, Menezes and Vella (1996), core samples from 60 per cent of wool lots were 
displayed 
'' Bookfair auctions are a minor exception, 
l9 The period under study ended in 1999. In 2000 a ten per cent Goods and Services Tax was introduced in Australia. 
The tax applies to books sold at auction. that private buyers' attitudes to risk differ from wholesale buyers', for example. Also, bidders for 
low value books might think about risk differently from bidders for high value books. Bidders 
also differ in their expertise, with some buyers well informed about previous prices, and others 
less so. 
Some bidders act as agents: booksellers frequently represent their clients at auctions, and 
institutional and corporate buyers also bid through intermediaries. Unfortunately, it is impossible 
to say which books were bought by agents. For some sales, the identity of  the buyer is published 
after the sale, but  this is not helpful precisely  because  the named  buyer might  have acted on 
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another's behalf. 
Despite a number of drawbacks, the data from sequential rare book auctions have several 
advantages over the data used in the main empirical studies in the literature. There are a large 
number of  sequences, and the sequences themselves contain identical assets, not merely similar 
ones. The book auctions are institutionally  similar to many other auctions, and are of  a type- 
ascending auctions-that  is relevant to the theoretical literature. 
5.  ANALYSIS 
In section 4, a case was made for treating bidders'  valuations at book auctions as affiliated. This 
is not enough to give a strong prediction about the likely pattern of  prices. The presence of multi- 
unit demand, for example, means that the reality of  sequential book auctions is more complex 
than the situation envisaged in the standard model with affiliated values. Nevertheless, there is no 
strong reason a priori  why price paths in sequences of  auctions of rare books will not be flat on 
average.  Non-decreasing  absolute risk  aversion  is  unlikely  to  characterise  book  buyers'  risk 
preferences; buyers'  options are not a feature of  Australian book auctions; scarcity effects are 
unlikely to be large; participation costs and superadditive values are unlikely to play a significant 
part; and there was no uncertainty about future buying opportunities in any of  the auctions, as a  v 
catalogue  of  lots was issued for each sale and the lots were  available for inspection. It is not 
known how the presence of  bidders with multi-unit demand will affect price paths on average,  .( 
nor is the precise extent of such bidders'  participation known. 
Accordingly,  in  this  section  the  hypothesis  is  explored, that  prices  in  sequences  of 
identical rare books are on average equal. The analysis takes in all the instances in Australian 
20 Chanel et al. (1996) used this distinction between amateurs and professionals. Book Auction Records in which two titles of  a book were offered in the same auction event. After 
a look at doubles whose books were not equivalent in quality, to show the influence of ordering 
strategies by  auctioneers, the analysis focuses on sequences of  books matched in  quality. The 
analysis of  matched books begins with a visual and statistical analysis of  price profiles in the 
sequences  of  auctions.  The  data  are  divided  into  relatively  homogenous  groups,  and  most 
importantly into different time periods. The profiles of  prices in different time periods are then 
examined using regression  and  other data analysis techniques. Regression  techniques  are also 
* 
used to analyse price profiles at different asset value levels. 
* 
5.1 Sequential auctions of books of differing quality 
There are 1744 instances in Australian Book Auction Records where two copies of  a book were 
sold sequentially.2' In some of these pairs, the second book was sold immediately after the first, 
while in others the books were separated by other lots. Not all the 1744 pairs comprise books of 
equivalent  condition.  The  importance  of  studying  sequential  auctions  of  identical  assets was 
stressed above. To separate out quality effects, the sample was divided into identical and non- 
identical pairs. Of the 1744 pairs, there are 1032 'matched' pairs and 712 'unmatched'  pairs. 
It  was pointed  out in section 3 that price paths in  sequences  of  auctions of  assets not 
matched in quality can be influenced by auctioneers'  ordering strategies. Did the auctioneers in 
the 712 unmatched sequences tend to follow a quality ordering strategy? Of the unmatched pairs, 
440  pairs  (61.8  per  cent)  had  the  best  book  offered  first, so  there  is  some  evidence  that 
auctioneers tended to put the best item first. There were differences across auction houses in the 
extent to which this strategy was followed. Table 2 gives the number of non-identical pairs for six 
auction firm groups, and the proportion of pairs in which the best book was offered first. 
Table 2: Ordering of non-identical pairs at various auction firms 
Leonard  Kenneth 
Christie's  Sotheby's  Lawsons  Joel  Hince  Other  All 
1 
Number of pairs  173  21  190  183  98  47  712 
Best first (%)  57.8  95.2  52.1  74.3  62.2  51.1  61.8  . 
In every category, better books were offered first more often than second, but there were large 
It is likely there were other sequences in which the first or second item or both Items were passed in for failing to 
reach the reserve price. These sequences are not included in the analysis because passed in items are not documented 
in Australian Book Auction Records. differences between the firms. Of the twenty-one Sotheby's pairs, twenty had the best lot offered 
first. In contrast, Lawsons and the 'other'  auction firms did not show such a strong tendency to 
offer better books first. 
5.2 Sequential auctions of identical books 
In the remainder of the analysis, the unmatched pairs are put to one side and only the matched 
pairs  are  examined.  There  are  1032  instances  where  two  identical  books  were  offered 
sequentially in the same auction. In identifying the 1032 pairs, books were judged to be identical 
I 
if  they could not be  separated  on  the grounds of  condition  or anything  else, such as edition, 
binding or unique features like inscriptions. Some of the 1032 pairs comprise books that are both 
Tine'---equivalent  to 'mint condition' in stamps. Some comprise books that share the same defect 
or  defects.  Common  defects  include  discolouration  of  paper,  broken  bindings  and  missing 
illustrations. 
This  matching  exercise  is  expected  to  remove  the  effect  of  deliberate  ordering  by 
auctioneers. It is unlikely that auctioneers apply a systematic ordering based on differences that 
are not sufficiently important to document in auction catalogues, when even minor differences in 
condition are disclosed. The influence of  any remaining undocumented quality differences in the 
book auction data should be random. 
Let us look more closely at the structure of the dataset. The dataset comprises two sets of 
prices: 1032 first prices (pi i)  and 1032 second prices (pa ;).  Every pl ;  is the first price realised 
in a sequence of  two auctions, and every p2 ;  is the second price realised in a sequence of two 
auctions. Every pl i therefore has a corresponding ~2,i.  That the pl  i and p2,i are tied in pairs is 
important, The price pairs resemble a repeated measures experimental design, in which the data 
comprise two sets of observations for a single group of  subjects, the first set of observations taken 
before a treatment is applied, the second set afterward. There is variation across the subjects, but 
the  variation  within  pairs  is  attributable  only  to the  influence of  the treatment,  and random 
changes. (The treatment is 'being second'  in a sequential auction of  two identical assets.) This 
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property will be exploited later.  . 
To make the price results comparable over time, the prices were adjusted to 1999 prices 
using the Australian consumer price index.22  Four outlying pairs were removed from the analysis. 
In all these four pairs, one price was more than four times the other. This left 1028 pairs. 
22 The figures were adjusted using the consumer price index figures in Australian Bureau of Statistics catalogue no. 
18 5.3 Grouping the sequences into more homogenous sets 
It was argued above that to analyse price paths in sequential auctions, the set of  sequences studied 
must be fairly homogenous, in terms of the structure of  the auctions, when and where they were 
held, and the nature of  the assets sold. The 1028 sequences are geographically homogenous. The 
great majority (97 per cent) are from auctions that were held in Melbourne and Sydney, and all 
the books in the pairs were sold in Australia. The sequences are also reasonably homogenous in  . 
the types of books sold, All of  them are rare books  'of Australasian  interest'  (all of  them were 
published  after  1787). There are large differences in the value of the books.  In  a typical book 
auction there will be a small number of  high value lots and a large number of  lower value lots. 
This profile is also seen in auctions of wine, art and other collectables. Whether price paths differ 
according to the value of the books being sold is explored in section 5.6 below. 
There is no reason to think that the pl,i's and ~2,i'~  are normally distributed. The reality 
is far from it. Figures 1 and 2 show the distributions of the logs of pl,i and ~2,i. 
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of first prices (logs) Figure 2: Frequency distribution of second prices (logs) 
The figures show that the price distributions are somewhat skewed in logs. In  the analysis that 
follows, the data are studied in logs. 
The sequences are not very homogenous with respect to when they were held. The dataset 
covers a  long period:  1969 to  1999. It  is  likely  that  the  rare  book  market  institutions and 
participants changed over this time. To achieve greater homogeneity, the 1028 pairs were divided 
into three time periods: 1969 to 1978, 1983 to 1990, and 1991 to 1999. The border between the 
first two periods is the break in the data from 1979 to 1982. The border between the second and 
third periods is more arbitrary, but divides the 1983 to 1999 period approximately in half in terms 
of  years  and  observations.  The  result  of  this  division  is  three  groups  of  pairs,  roughly 
corresponding to the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
The pairs  are also not  very  homogenous in  terms of  auctioneers. The dataset includes 
results  from  international  auction  houses  that  operate  in  Australia,  as  well  as  from  large 
Australian auction houses, and small Australian auction houses. There may be important 'house  1 
style'  and other differences between these  groups of  auction firms. To increase homogeneity 
across firms, the pairs were classified into three groups: those from international auction firms  . 
operating in  Australia (Christie's  and  Sotheby's);  those from  large  Australian  auction  firms 
(Leonard Joel, Kenneth Hince and Lawson's); and those from smaller Australian auctioneers. 
This gave nine groups altogether: SMALL  1970s (136 pairs), SMALL  1980s (ll), SMALL  1990s 
(13), LARGE  1970s (166), LARGE  1980s (233), LARGE 1990s (179), INTERNATIONAL  1970s (169), 
INTERNATIONAL  1980s (64), and INTERNATIONAL  1990s (57). 5.4 Graphical analysis of sequences with identical books 
To begin the analysis of the pairs, the logs of all the first prices were plotted against the logs of 
all the second prices, for each of the nine groups. The scatter plots showed a strong tendency for 
the prices  in  each  pair  to be  equal. Differences among the  nine  groups  were  evident in  the 
distribution  of  values  between  low  and  high  value  books-reflecting  the  fact  that  different 
auction  houses  tend  over-proportionately  to  service  particular  segments  of  the  rare  book  .  market-and  in the degree of deviation of points from the forty-five degree line. But the plots all 
showed the  same general pattern:  the  points  clustered around  the forty-five degree line. The 
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correlations between the first and second prices are imperfect, but high, ranging between 0.73 and 
0.99 for the nine groups.23  (This highlights a basic difference between auctions and sales with 
posted prices. In auctions, identical assets will not necessarily realise identical prices even on the 
same day at the same place.) 
It is not easy to tell from scatter plots whether points below  the forty-five degree line 
(representing declining price paths) or points above the line (rising price paths) predominate. To 
give a clearer picture of the price paths, frequency distributions were prepared for the differences 
in  logs of  pl  i and p2 i for each of  the nine groups. This graphical analysis exploits the paired 
structure of  the data and promises to reveal features that are hidden when price ratios are used 
(c/f. Ashenfelter, 1989, and McAfee and Vincent, 1993). Within each decade, the distributions of 
price differences were similar across the auctioneer groups, indicating that the division of the 
dataset into auctioneer groups was inappropriate. The observations for each  auctioneer group 
were therefore combined, and distributions were prepared for each of  the three decades, Figures 
3, 4 and 5 show the three distributions. (Distributions of ratios of Pl,i to p2 i were also prepared. 
There were  no  differences between  those  and  the  figures here  that  had  implications for the 
analysis.) 
23 Correlations between real prices: SMALL 1970s 0.86, SMALL 1980s 0.99, SMALL 1990s 0.73, LARGE 1970s 0.92, 
LARGE 1980s 0.98, LARGE 1990s 0.99, INTERNATIONAL  1970s 0.91, INT.  1980s 0.96, WT.  1990s 0.84, all 1970s 0.90, 
all 1980s 0.97, all 1990s 0.94. Log prices: SMALL 1970s 0.90, SMALL 1980s 0.97, SMALL 1990s 0.86, LARGE 1970s 
0.93, LARGE 1980s 0.95, LARGE 1990s 0.93, INT. 1970s 0.93, INT.  1980s 0.98, INT. 1990s 0.93, all 1970s 0.93, all 
1980s 0.97, all 1990s 0.94. Figure 3: Differences in log prices, 1970s 
all 70s  (471 abs) 
log tPl) - log (P2) 
Figure 4: Differences in log prices, 1980s Figure 5: Differences in log prices, 1990s 
The figure for the 1970s group is strikingly different to the figures for the other decades. 
It shows a distribution with peaks on either side of  zero. The number of flat paths (representing 
equal prices) is very small: there are only three perfectly flat paths out of 471 pairs. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, in contrast, there was a strong tendency for price paths to be perfectly flat. In these 
two decades, zero was the mode and the median difference; in the 1970s, the mode and median 
were above zero. In  section 5.5, the dissimilarity  of  the  1970s distribution with the other two 
figures is explored further. 
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the three decades: the proportion of rising, flat and 
falling price paths, the standard deviation of the differences in log prices, and the average ratio of 
Pl,i to p2 i (real prices, not logs). 
Table 3: Summary statistics for price pairs in three decade groups 
std deviation of 
differences in  average ratio 
n  pr(rising)  pr(flat)  pr(falling)  log prices  of pl  to p2 
all 70s  47 i  ,427  .006  367  .I63  1.11 
all 80s  308  .344  .256  .399  .I30  1.05 
all 90s  249  .349  .I73  ,478  .I46  1.12 
Ashenfelter (1989) found in wine auctions that, while it was 'most common for the price 
to remain constant, prices are at least twice as likely to decline as to increase'. This is not the case in  Australian rare book  auctions. In the 1980s and 1990s, Figures 4 and 5 show that flat paths 
were the most common, but Table 3 shows that the number of  falling paths was less than twice 
the number of  rising paths. In the  1970s, flat paths were not the most common, and again the 
number of falling paths was less than twice the number of rising paths. 
Table 3 shows that the differences in the 1970s were marginally more dispersed than in 
the other decades, and that in all decades prices were usually not flat. In every period, there were 
more declining paths than  any other type, and flat paths were never more common than rising 
paths or falling paths taken as a group. In the 1990s, almost half of all pairs had declining prices. 
1 
There were similarities across the three decades in the slopes of price paths that were not 
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flat. In  the 1970s, prices that rose did so on average by 39.9 per cent; prices that fell did so on 
average by 23.9 per cent. The corresponding figures for the 1980s are 36.5 per cent and 21.0 per 
cent respectively.  For the  1990s, 31.6 per  cent  and 22.3 per  cent  respectively.  In  all  cases, 
therefore, there were fewer rising price paths than  flat paths, but rising paths were on  average 
steeper than  falling paths. This is consistent  with  Weber's  (1983) prediction  of  flat paths  on 
average. Excluding the flat paths, the distributions of differences in log prices were similar across 
the three decades. 
To formally analyse price paths, Ashenfelter (1989) took ratios of first and second prices 
and compared them with one. On its own, this is a poor method because it conceals features in 
the data that are revealed by visual analysis of distributions of price differences such as in Figures 
3-5.  For example, suppose the 1970s distribution of differences had a bimodal shape but one that 
was symmetric around zero. The average price difference would be zero, but the average would 
conceal an underlying process that never generated paths at the average. Price ratios also conceal 
potential  differences  in  price  paths  at  different  asset  values.  Nevertheless,  for the  sake  of 
comparison  with Ashenfelter, analogous ratios  were prepared for the three decades (Table 3). 
None of the ratios was statistically different from one. This is evidence that unique features of 
wine auctions, such as the buyer's  option described in section 2, played a part in the prevalence 
of declining paths that was observed by Ashenfelter, and by McAfee and Vincent (1993).  a 
Using Ashenfelter's  ratio  method, the  hypothesis  that  prices  in  sequential  auctions  of 
Australian books are on average flat would be accepted for all three decades. But the distributions 
of price differences and the statistical analysis presented in this section suggest the hypothesis 
warrants supplementation. It has been shown that the finding of increasing price paths on average 
can be  associated with  more than  one underlying  profile  of  price  differences.  The processes 
generating the data are more complex than the hypothesis can accommodate. 
A supplementary hypothesis is that flat price paths are usual, and that deviations from a flat path are random. This hypothesis is accepted for the 1980s and 1990s, but not for 1970s. 
5.5 Explaining the differences between the time periods 
How might the large difference between the distributions for the 1970s and those for the 1980s 
and 1990s be accounted for? 
The data were searched to see if  particular flat, rising or falling paths tended to come 
I  over-proportionately from a particular auction, a particular auctioneer, or a particular time period. 
No such bunching was found. 
The  1970s group was split into two halves (1969-1973,  250 pairs, and  1974-1978,  221 
pairs) to see if the same profile of price differences was evident in the subgroups. The profiles for 
the two subgroups were very similar to each other and to the distribution for the whole  1970s 
group. 
It was noted in section 4 that the book auction data from 1969 to 1978 were not compiled 
by the same person as those for the other decades. Could this explain the difference? The present 
author checked  the Australian Book Auction Records  entries against the  source catalogues  to 
check their reliability, and confirmed that the condition information and the prices are accurate. A 
way to test formally for the influence of data collection is to look at the proportion of  all doubles 
that  were  coded  'identical'  in  each  year. The number  of  doubles is independent  of  condition 
coding by  the compiler (as  are the price  data). If  a structural  break  in  the share  of  identical 
doubles  coincided  with  the  break  in  the  data,  that  would  be  evidence  condition  was  coded 
differently, and specifically that a different test was applied to determine identity. The share of 
identical doubles in all doubles in each year was regressed on time and on a dummy variable that 
took a value of  zero before the data break, and one after the break. The share of identical doubles 
declined significantly  over time (t = -2.86), but the dummy variable was not significant (t = - 
0.47). This indicates that condition coding was not the source of the difference between the 1970s 
a  and the other decades.24  (The decline in the share of identical doubles makes sense, as the overall 
quality of  rare books declines over time, and in random ways due to accidents and differences in 
4  storage. At the same time, the scarcity of individual titles increases due to the loss and destruction 
24 It is conceivable that the 1970s books differed from those sold in other periods. For example, they could have been 
more valuable on average. To test whether this difference caused the observed profiles of prices, the average (log) 
price (ie. the average of each pair of prices) was regressed on time to see if  there was a time trend in the value of the 
books. The time variable was not significant. The regression was repeated with a dummy variable equal to one 
before the gap, and zero after. Again, the time variable was insignificant, as was the dummy variable. of copies, and purchases by institutions.) 
Another set of arguments concern changes in the way book auctions worked. It is possible 
that the number of  participants reached a critical level in the late 1970s or early 1980s, and that 
this extra liquidity tended to flatten price paths  in sequential auctions of  identical  books. The 
extra liquidity  may  have been  associated  with  a maturing  of  the rare book  auction  circuit  in 
Australia,  when  the  market  institutions  became  more  established,  bidders  developed  more 
confidence  in  the  institutions,  and  participants  in  general  had  better  information  about  sale 
processes and values."  If this conjecture were true, it might suggest evidence from other markets 
> 
of  systematically declining prices reflected  an immaturity in those markets, and that declining 
prices were only a temporary feature. This deserves further exploration.26  .. 
5.6 Book values and price paths 
It was noted in section 5.3 that the book auction data are not very homogenous with respect to the 
value of  the books being sold. Do price paths in the sequential auctions differ according to the 
value  of  the books?  There  are reasons to expect  they might.  Bidders'  behaviours  at  auctions 
plausibly  depend on the size of  the outlay they  are called on to make. Bidders making small 
financial  commitments may be less worried  about risk-such  as the risk of  overpaying-than 
bidders making large purchases. Expertise may also play different roles at different price levels. 
Bidders making larger purchases  may be more willing to seek out information  about historical 
prices, for example. 
To test if price paths are influenced by the average sale price in a sequence, the difference 
in the logs of the prices was regressed on the average value of the books, and a constant term, for 
each of the three decade groups, and for the whole sample. In none of  the regressions was the 
coefficient on the average value variable significant at the 5 per cent level of significance. In the 
1990s regression only, the coefficient was significant at the 10 per cent level (t = 1.73), indicating 
a small positive relationship between the degree of the price decline and the value of  the books 
sold. 
25 Also, with more bidders, collusion is less likely to be viable. 
26 The only instance in the empirical literature of researchers returning to a previously studied auction setting is the 
work by McAfee and Vincent (1993) on wine auctions, in the footsteps of Ashenfelter (1989). But the data studied in 
these two papers overlaps in time-Ashenfelter  looked at results from 1985-87,  McAfee and Vincent from 1987-so 
they do not shed light on the evolution of wine auctions. 6.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper presented the results from a preliminary analysis of a set of sequential auctions of rare 
books.  Sequential auctions are interesting because they offer insights into how  auctions work, 
insights that are not available when non-identical lots are sold. 
Rare book  auctions offer a promising environment in which to examine price paths in 
sequential  auctions. Australian  Book Australian Records contains  a large number of  identical 
$ 
pairs of  books that were auctioned sequentially on the same day at the same place. The book 
auction records permit the analysis of  price results  across different groups  of  auctioneers,  and 
I 
across a range of values, from very low value books to very expensive ones. 
A  preliminary  examination  of  every  sequential  pair  of  auctions  in  Australian  Book 
Auction Records indicated that auctioneers tend to put better books first in sequences of  auctions 
of  non-identical books. The analysis then focused on sequences of  auctions of  identical books. 
While in  every decade falling paths were more numerous than flat paths  and rising paths, the 
preponderance of falling paths was not as strong as that found by Ashenfelter (1989) and McAfee 
and Vincent (1993) using data from wine auctions, The hypothesis of  declining price paths on 
average was rejected for all three decades. The revised hypothesis, that flat paths were usual and 
that deviations from flat paths were random, was accepted for the 1980s and 1990s, but rejected 
for the 1970s. This preliminary finding of  different price paths over time is new in the sequential 
auctions literature. The pattern of  prices was found not to depend on the value of the books being 
sold, though there was some evidence of  a small positive relationship between book values and 
the average extent of  price declines in  the  1990s. The analysis provides  some support for the 
conjecture that auction markets with a paucity of flat price paths are immature. This is an  issue 
warranting further study. REFERENCES 
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